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#21
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VMI Marine,
Funny you would mention DASC Bingo, I was just telling some students about it in the last Captain's Career Course class I taught. Yes, it did happen, and VERY often too. The issue actually had less to do with FSCMs, than "issues" with V Corps ASOC. They "issues" were that they tried to micromanage too large an AO, with too few personnel/systems. Here's the short version of the story. When we built the plan for how to conduct that fight, there was a very clean line between Killbox Interdiction and Close Air Support. Without getting into too much detail, the line I am talking about is the cut between 'needs a lot of ASOC management (for the CAS fight) and doesn't need a lot of ASOC management (the KI fight)'. Prior to OIF, V Corps and their ASOC had exercised a plan where the ASOC micromanaged everything in the Corps AO, they called it all Corps CAS. In theory, (like Communism) it briefs very well. The ASOC, working the issues of the Ground Commander, has total control, thus absolutely enabling the Ground Commander to control the Priority, Effects, and Timing of fires in his AO. Doctrinally, the right thing. Unfortunately, in all the exercises that V Corps ran to test this theory, they only focused on the micromanagement portion of their "success", and did not look at the useage rates for the aircraft in the CAS stacks, which was very low. Exercises are great things, however, they do not come close to real world experience. So, despite literally 24 straight hours of talking to V Corps' ASOC prior to my briefing the Land Component on the KI-CAS plan for the war, I could not convince them that my experience from multiple OEF rotations taught me lessons that their exercises did not show them. So, when the war started, the ASOC quickly became overwhelmed trying to micro manage the V Corps AO. While they were micromanaging, the aircraft, that weren't getting used, were running out of gas before they could do anything. After a day or two, the pilots learned to check in with an artificially short play time. They were building in a false bingo, to allow fuel for crossing from the left to the right side of the fight. When they checked in with the DASC, they were usually pushed across the BCL (how the Marines fixed the fact that the Army had placed the FSCL too far in front) to plink tanks. No micromanagement required, simply "you are cleared to 88AS, look for Tanks, APC, or artillery" and off they would go, happy to kill and break things. Meanwhile the DASC (actually more than just the DASC) was free to focus on the CAS fight, knowing the tanks in front of the the Marines were getting the crap kicked out of them. Now, back on the topic of contract air. This kinda ties in with my exercise vs real world comparison. I think contract air as 'the solution' for all the shortages of air for JTAC and JFO training/sustainment is a checker player's solution when the game is chess. Here is what I mean. First, no doubt we are running out of aircraft to do the JTAC/JFO training/sustainment; so, on the surface contract air sounds great. Here is why, without parallel plans to get the military inventory moving the other direction (more planes/pilots), it is a mistake. First, the plan is to increase JTAC/JFO production. Literally producing as many as we can. Second, in order to do this, you need airplanes to control. The numbers of pilots in the services is simple math, XX pilots for YY aircraft on the ramp. Reducing the YY variable, means less pilots. The YY variable is dropping at what I would consider an alarming rate. Aircraft are literally flying their wings off, and the replacement plan is F-35. The F-35 plan was never a one for one swap of current jets. So, if the plan was simply "every three old jets will be replaced by one F-35" before the wars, then add to that the fact that everything that shoots is flying WAY more sorties per year than forecasted when they were built...flying the wings off. So, these old jets must be retired. Even though F-35 isn't full up on the streets, DoD has said to keep retiring the old jets. This means the Air Force will have less jets on the ramp, thus must have less pilots too (changes to YY mean changes to XX, by LAW!) JTAC/JFO numbers increasing...check. Retiring the old jets according to plan...check. Reducing the numbers of pilots in the inventory...check. Use contract air to fill the training gap...check. Have enough military planes/pilots to fly CAS in the next war...CRAP. |
#22
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Quote:
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FISHDO |
#23
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"This is how it is when the war machine rolls back and forth. You take your pleasure where you can and when you can, and let the circumstances be damned. For tomorrow you may be somewhere else." - Cass "I understand all of the words you used, but I don't know what you just said." - Gen. Hagee speaking to the MEU S-3 |
#24
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What SLAB said, +10
BTW, little birdy told me Congrats are in order Co Cdr. S/F OB
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RIP "Southside" "Bub" "Rone" "Puddy" "Hawk" "Big'N" "Heeler" "Bong" Maj Samuel "Swacq" Griffith, 4th ANGLICO - December 14, 2011 Helmand, Afghanistan Capt Warren "War" Frank, 5th ANGLICO - November 25, 2008 Baiji, Iraq GySgt Marcelo Velasco, 4th ANGLICO - November 19, 2008 Fallujah, Iraq Sgt Jeremiah McGraw, 4th ANGLICO - September 10, 2009 Lightning from the Sky, Thunder from the Sea! |
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